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INTRODUCTION 
We applaud the contribution that the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (White Commission) has 
made to the public debate regarding how the federal courts of appeals 
can cope with the demands of ever increasing caseloads and no new 
judicial resources. 1 The White Commission has conscientiously 
discharged its challenging assignment in the very brief period which 
Congress allotted. We believe, however, that a careful review of the 
Commission's research reveals no significant evidence of dysfunction in 
any court of appeals, and certainly none sufficiently severe to warrant its 
ultimate recommendation to restructure the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals into three autonomous adjudicative divisions. We submit that 
the Commission has not met its burden of persuasion for such sweeping 
change. Therefore, we urge Congress to authorize the Ninth Circuit, 
which has been the acknowledged national leader in experimenting with 
innovative methods of resolving large caseloads, to continue and expand 
upon that record of successful experimentation. 
In this article, we suggest that those who propose to change a 
successful, century-old institution must bear the burden of persuasion 
regarding the need for modification. In the first section of this article, 
we explore some of the principal concerns that the members of the 
Commission, as well as certain observers of the Ninth Circuit, have 
raised during the study process. In the second section, we show that, by 
standard measures of judicial administration and performance, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is operating as well as or better than the 
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
t Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We wish to 
thank Mark Mendenhall, Assistant Circuit Executive, for invaluable assistance in the preparation of 
this article as well as Eleanor Davison for processing this piece. Professor Tobias wishes lo thank 
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Jim Rogers for his generous, continuing support. These 
remarks are those of the authors, although they reflect the position of two-thirds of the members of 
the Ninth Circuit. 
I See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAlS, FINAL 
REPORT ( 1998) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT). 
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other courts of appeals which were not the focus of the White 
Commission's recommendations. The next section reviews how the 
untested restructuring proposed by the Commission will cause more 
problems than it was intended to fix. Finally, in the fourth section, we 
offer a constructive alternative approach that the Ninth Circuit has 
already implemented. We examine the work of the Ninth Circuit's 
Evaluation Committee, which is developing innovative solutions to 
address many of the same concerns that the Commission sought to 
alleviate through its restructuring proposal. Through more modest 
modifications to court operations, the Ninth Circuit will be able to 
maintain its flexibility and adaptability in order to meet the caseload 
demands of the next millennium. We conclude by suggesting that 
Congress authorize the Ninth Circuit to continue experimenting with 
measures that promise to enhance court operations. 
I. WHAT w AS THE COMMISSION TRYING To Fix? 
The origins and development of the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals do not require exposition 
here because other authors, in this journal and elsewhere, have 
comprehensively explored them.2 Drawn.from the Commission's series 
of six public hearings, surveys of judges and appellate lawyers, and 
receipt of written comments, its final report includes a summary of the 
arguments that proponents· and critics of circuit-splitting have 
articulated in the longstanding debate over the Ninth Circuit. These 
claims and counterclaims "concern the effects of the size of the court of 
appeals, its geographic jurisdiction, and the court's place within the 
federal appellate system."3 
Among its findings were, first, that advocates of circuit division assert 
that the Ninth Circuit's size precludes it from functioning in a timely 
and effective fashion. 4 Second, proponents of circuit-splitting claim that 
the court cannot maintain a consistent, coherent, and predictable body 
of circuit law.5 Third, those who favor bifurcation question the ability of 
2 See, e.g.,Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A Farmer Cl.erli's View o/tlie Proposed Ninth Circuit 
Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 875 ( 1998); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 
FLA. L. REV. 189 (1997). 
3 Final Report, supra note 1, at 34. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. at 34-35. 
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the court to perform its en bane function efficiently, principally because 
it is thought to convene too few en bane proceedings to foster the 
development of stable circuit law.6 Fourth, circuit division proponents 
contend that the size of the court's geographic jurisdiction undermines 
regionalism and frustrates effective court operations.7 In its attempt to 
evaluate these allegations, the Commission concluded that: 
We have reviewed all of the available objective data routinely used in 
court administration to measure the performance and efficiency of the 
federal appellate courts, but we cannot say that the statistical criteria tip 
decisively in one direction or the other. While there are differences 
among the courts of appeals, differences in judicial vacancy rates, 
caseload mix, and operating procedures make it impossible to attribute 
them to any single factor such as size.8 
The commissioners correspondingly consulted "subjective criteria, 
such as consistency and predictability of the law [which] are obviously 
more difficult to evaluate but are widely regarded as a high priority for 
the courts of appeals."9 The commission members frankly 
acknowledged that they lacked adequate time to conduct a statistically 
meaningful analysis of Ninth Circuit decision making to reach an 
objective determination of how the court compares with others, and 
they eventually concluded that uniformity and predictability defy 
statistical evaluation.10 We, however, believe that a careful examination 
of court management statistics and available empirical research over the 
past ten years convincingly demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is operating within the mainstream of the federal appellate 
courts and that it is efficiently and effectively maintaining control ofits 
caseload. 
II. WHAT OBJECTIVE AND EMPIRICAL MEASURES DEMONSTRATE 
We have assembled below-<:overing the last ten years-a compilation 
of six of the objective criteria routinely used to compare core court of 
appeals operations. They relate to the time it takes to resolve appeals, 
the amount of workload per judge, the volume of opinions that judges 
6 See id. at 35. 
7 See id. at 36. 
8 See id. at 39. 
9 Id. 
IO See id. at 39-40 (citation omitted). 
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need to keep up with, and the circuit's reversal rate by the United States 
Supreme Court. Although other issues relating to consistency and 
predictability of decision-making are much more difficult to measure 
and are not routinely collected by the courts, we have cited some 
additional empirical research on these topics. We submit that, when 
these major concerns are viewed from the perspective of objective 
operational data and scientific inquiry, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals fares as well as or better than the other eleven geographic-based 
circuits in the nation. 
Delays in resolving cases are measured through median time 
intervals. Median time intervals in cases terminated after hearing or 
submission have been maintained in the courts of appeals for decades 
and serve as a starting point for comparing the circuits. 11 Median time 
interval charts further subdivide the time from filing a notice of appeal 
to final disposition into four subparts: (1) the time from filing a notice 
of appeal to filing last brief; (2) the time from filing of last brief to 
hearing or submission; (3) the time from hearing to final disposition; 
and ( 4) the time from submission (without oral argument) to final 
disposition. 12 The latter two categories are important as they are the 
only two categories over which the judges themselves have full control-
that is, the cases are in their hands for resolution. The first segment 
depends largely upon timely action by the lawyers. The second depends 
upon prompt filling of judicial vacancies to assure the sufficient number 
of judges to maintain regular calendars for hearing appeals. A glance at 
these time intervals over the past ten years demonstrates several points: 
•Ninth Circuit times from filing of notice of appeal to 
final disposition have remained relatively consistent, 
ranging from a high of 16.0 months (after the 1989 
earthquake closed the courthouse) to a low most 
recently of 13.8 months, while the national median has 
gradually increased from 10.1 months to 11.6 months. 13 
Generally, the Ninth Circuit's median time from filing 
the notice of appeal to final disposition has averaged less 
than four months longer than the national median time 
11 See 1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS viii. 
12 See 1998ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 111-13. 
13 See 1989-1998 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP'S. (Median Time 
Inteival Charts) 111-13. 
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(except in 1989-1992, when the court was forced to 
relocate because of the earthquake). 14 The most recent 
figures show that the Ninth Circuit's median is only 2.2 
months longer than the national median. 15 
• The District of Columbia, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have frequently reported higher median 
times than the Ninth Circuit over the ten year 
period. 16 
• The judges in the Ninth Circuit are among the fastest 
in the nation in terms of the median time from 
hearing to final disposition, varying from 1.6 to 2.8 
months, usually in the top third among the circuits.17 
• Similarly, Ninth Circuit judges are among the fastest 
in the nation in the median time from submission to 
final disposition, varying from .1 to .9 months, which 
places them usually in the top quarter of the 
circuits. 18 
401 
It is all the more remarkable that the court has been able to maintain 
its pace of case dispositions and output of published opinions since it 
has experienced a one-third reduction in the number of active judges. 
The Ninth Circuit has generally operated with between four and ten 
vacancies since 1994, reflecting a significant diminution in judicial 
resources available to handle its growing caseload. 19 Innovations in 
caseload management, increases in mediated settlements, and generous 
contributions by senior and visiting judges have prevented the court 
from falling as far behind as the numbers appear to indicate. There 
comes a point of diminishing returns, however, when heavy and 
unremitting reliance on these resources can no longer continue to 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See FINAL REPORT, supra note l, at 30. 
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produce the results the court requires to operate effectively. The Ninth 
Circuit believes strongly that with a full complement of active judges, its 
performance would improve even further and eliminate much of the 
concern raised before the Commission. 
One indication of judicial workload is the number of case 
terminations on the merits per judge, a figure that is a standard 
objective measure of the workload levels of the courts of appeals. These 
numbers have increased over time as federal appellate caseloads have 
expanded and no new judges have been added to handle the increases. 
However, there appears to be no correlation between the size of the 
court and the number of merit terminations per judge. A review of ten 
years of statistics reveals several findings: 
• Ninth Circuit merit terminations per judge have 
increased from a low of 25 7 in 1988 to a high of 518 in 
1997, while the range for all circuits has fluctuated 
between a low of 173 and a high of 792.20 
• For five of the past ten years, the number of Ninth 
Circuit merit terminations per judge has hovered within 
30 cases of the median range for all courts, placing the 
Ninth Circuit output at the level deemed most 
appropriate for a federal court of appeals. 21 
• For most of the years in the decade, the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had the highest 
numbers of merit terminations per judge, reflecting the 
exceptionally heavy caseload burdens in those circuits.22 
An additional comment heard in connection with the Ninth Circuit is 
that the volume of published opinions is so large that judges and lawyers 
have trouble keeping current with the development of new circuit law. 
A review of the figures for the past ten years shows: 
20 See 1989-1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (Overall Caseload Statistics Tables) 
26. 
21 See 1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 20. 
22 See id. at 26. 
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• In the Ninth Circuit, the number of published opinions 
has fluctuated between a high of 986 and a low of 682 
per year, with no particular trend toward increasing or 
decreasing significantly during that period.23 
• Nationwide, the range of published opinions has varied 
from a low of 232 (the low figure has almost always 
reflected the output of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals) to a high of 1,079, with the Ninth Circuit 
generally on the high end of the range.24 
• The Ninth Circuit's output of published opinions has 
remained relatively constant during a period in which 
the number of cases filed in the court has more than 
doubled. 25 
• The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have occasionally 
exceeded the output of the Nin th Circuit and generally 
issue only 100 fewer opinions per year than the Ninth 
Circuit.26 
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In the electronic age, however, the relevance of the number of 
written, published opinions to the debate is questionable. First, the 
volume of published opinions does not correlate with circuit size. For 
example, in 1998, three other circuits issued more published opinions 
than did the Ninth Circuit.27 Second, the White Commission states that 
~e Ninth Circuit's large volume of published opinions makes it 
"impossible for all the court's judges to read all the court's published 
opinions when they are issued" and implies that the volume is so large 
that it hampers judges from being able to "monitor the decisions of all 
panels of the court so that their own decisions are consistent with earlier 
decisions of the court. "28 
23 See 1989-1998 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (Table on the Types of Opinions or 
Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs) 54. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 47. 
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Professor Arthur Hellman, in his written testimony to the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, suggested 
that the Commission's reliance on this theory is misplaced. 
Distinguishing between keeping up with circuit law and monitoring 
panel opinions, he wrote, 
Keeping up with circuit law is something done by 
individual judges .... With all circuit law now easily 
retrievable by computer when it is needed, there is no 
particular reason for individual judges to acquire 
familiarity with decisions that have no relevance for any 
of their current cases .... Monitoring panel opinions, in 
contrast, is something that the court does as an 
institution .... But effective monitoring does not require 
that all judges keep up with all opinions. As long as each 
opinion receives some scrutiny by off-panel judges, the 
objectives can be met. ... One would think that, other 
things being equal, an annual output of 800 opinions 
could be monitored more easily by 28 judges than by 14 . 
. . . The larger the number of judges engaged in the 
monitoring process, the greater the likelihood that a 
particular error or inconsistency will catch the eye of at 
least one member of the court.29 
The Ninth Circuit's relatively high rate of reversal in the United 
States Supreme Court has also been mentioned by some as cause for 
concern, requiring circuit restructuring. A look at the ten year reversal 
rates reveals: 
• The number of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed each year 
by the United States Supreme Court is usually in the 16-
24 range and has never exceeded 30 cases, representing 
less than one-half of 1 percent of merit terminations by 
the Ninth Circuit.30 
29 Oversight Hearing on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 
106"' Cong. 7 (1999) (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law) [hereinafter Hellman Statement]. 
30 Sll NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS LAW LIBRARY TABLE ON UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT REVERSAL RATES 1 ( 1998) [hereinafter Reversal Rate Table]. 
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• For most years, the Ninth Circuit has had the highest 
number of cases selected for review by the Supreme 
Court- sometimes three or four times more cases than 
other circuits.31 
• In only one year in the last ten did the Ninth Circuit 
have the highest reversal rate of all of the circuits. For 
three years its reversal rate was lower than the median 
for all circuits, and for two years its rate was within eight 
percentage points of the median.32 
• The Supreme Court generally reviews cases with an eye 
toward reversal, as the median reversal rate for all years 
except two exceeded 50 percent, and the overall reversal 
rate exceeded 60 percent in five of the ten years under 
consideration. 33 
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However, the relevance of the Supreme Court reversal rate to matters 
of court of appeals administration and configuration is questionable. 
The concept of judicial independence is threatened when the 
substantive decisions of a court serve as the basis for circuit division or 
realignment, ostensibly for the purpose of changing the outcome of 
decisions before the court. The Commission itself recognized this 
principle in its statement: "It is wrong to realign circuits ... and to 
restructure courts . . . because of particular judicial decisions or 
particular judges. "34 
For many years observers have also raised concerns about the ability 
of a large court to maintain coherency, consistency, and predictability in 
its case law. With no time to conduct its own study and no routinely 
maintained court data to review, the Commission seemed to throw up its 
hands by saying: "But when all is said and done, neither we nor, we 
believe, anyone else, can reduce consistency and predictability to 
31 See The Honorable Jerome Farris, Tiie Ninth Circuit- Most Maligned Circuit in the Country - Fact 
or F"iction1, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1465, 1465-66 (1997), for an insightful examination of the circuit's 
reversal rate for 1997. 
32 See Reversal Rate Table, supra note 30, at 4. 
33 See id. at l. 
34 FINAL REPORT, supra note l, at 6. 
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statistical analysis."35 Without more, however, the members of the 
Commission then concluded that "large appellate units have difficulty 
maintaining consistent and coherent law"36 and leapt to their ultimate 
determination that such coherence "is best fostered in a decisional unit 
that is small enough for ... close, continual, collaborative decision 
making .... "37 The divisional restructuring proposal is the result of that 
reasoning. 
What the Commission apparently rejected in reaching its conclusion 
was systematic empirical research that found that inconsistency in the 
law is neither a serious problem in the Ninth Circuit nor a factor of 
circuit size. An objective, highly praised scholarly study of consistency of 
the law in the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the pattern of [multiple 
relevant precedents] exemplified by high visibility issues ... is not 
characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally. Nor is 
intracircuit conflict."38 A subsequent national study by the Federal 
Judicial Center reached a similar conclusion when it stated, "In sum, 
despite concerns about the proliferation of precedent as the courts of 
appeals grow, there is currently little evidence that intracircuit 
inconsistency is a significant problem. Also, there is little evidence that 
whatever intracircuit conflict exists is strongly correlated with circuit 
size."39 
We believe that the objective operational data and empirical evidence 
show that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is and has been operating 
as well as or better than the other circuit courts of appeals across the 
country. No evidence has been produced to demonstrate any 
dysfunction or inability to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent 
circuit law that would justify circuit restructuring of the magnitude 
proposed by the White Commission. Those who propose dramatic 
alteration to a century-old institution, which now resolves appeals 
promptly, fairly, and consistently and that operates efficiently, must bear 
the burden of proving that such a change is necessary and will better 
deliver appellate services than the time-tested methods and structure 
35 Id. at 40. 
36 Id. at 47. 
37 Id. at 40. 
38 RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: Tm: INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTI I CIRCUIT AND THE FuTURE OFTI IE 
FEDERALCoURTS86 (ArthurD. Hellman ed. 1990). 
39 JUDITl-1 MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATM:S FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS 94 (1993). 
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that have worked so well in the Ninth Circuit and in all of the other 
courts of appeals across the country. Indeed, the Commission candidly 
admitted that Ninth Circuit administration was at least equal to that of 
other circuits and "innovative in many respects."40 Critics of the Ninth 
Circuit, therefore, must conclusively demonstrate that the court is 
operating so ineffectively as to deserve a remedy as radical and untested 
as the divisional approach. These critics, as well as the Commission, have 
not sustained this burden. 
Ill. THE FLAWED DMSIONAL SOLUTION 
The centerpiece of the Commission's Final Report is the 
recommendation that Congress require the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to implement a divisional arrangement, and authorize the 
remaining courts to apply this approach when they attain a certain 
size.41 The Commission proposed that lawmakers create three divisions 
for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 42 Each of these divisions would 
hear appeals arising within its geographic jurisdiction, each would have 
its own en bane process, and each would function autonomously in that it 
would not have to follow precedent issued in the other divisions. 43 The 
Commission also suggested the establishment of a Circuit Division which 
would resolve "square inter-divisional conflict"44 between two divisions. 
The preceding section shows that the Commission did not prove that 
the Ninth Circuit experiences difficulties which require remediation, 
especially with a solution as dramatic and disruptive as the divisional 
approach appears. 45 Even if, for the sake of argument, the Commission 
had clearly shown that the Ninth Circuit faces the problems to which the 
members of the Commission alluded, the Commission failed to 
demonstrate that the divisional arrangement would remedy those 
complications. The divisional proposal is a drastic idea which no federal 
appeals court has ever adopted, which would disrupt effective aspects of 
40 FINAi. REPORT, supra note l, at ix. 
41 See id. at iii, x, 40-47, 60-62. 
42 See id. at 41. 
43 See id. at 41-43. 
44 Id. at 45. 
45 See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 2; see also Procter Hug, Jr., 171e C,ormnission on 
Structural Allemalives for lite Federal Courts of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of lite Commissions 
Recom1nendalionsfor the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887 (1999). 
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current Ninth Circuit administration, and which might well exacerbate 
the very conditions that it is intended to address. Indeed, Second 
Circuit Chief Judge Ralph Winter wrote the Commission expressing his 
court's "strong and unanimous opposition" to the divisional notion 
while stating that there is no experience with the divisional idea and that 
the courts are "hardly working so badly that ... resort to a very different 
and untested form of organization is called for. "46 The chief judge 
asserted that the divisional approach would "lead . . . to more 
incoherence in case law," would increase forum shopping, and would 
require more judges.47 The essential question is whether the 
recommended change achieves the goal of "having a single court 
interpret and apply the federal law in the nine western United States 
and the Island Territories in an efficient and effective manner."48 
Perhaps the critical flaw in the divisional scheme is its abandonment 
of the concept of circuit-wide stare decisis, a rule of law which is crucial 
to the maintenance of a consistent, coherent, and predictable body of 
circuit law in the Ninth Circuit and in every other federal court of 
appeals. 49 Under current practice, threejudge panel decisions are 
binding throughout the circuit and on all subsequent panels, unless they 
are overruled by the court of appeals en bane or by the Supreme Court. 50 
"The limited en bane procedure provides a mechanism whereby all 
judges can participate in the en bane process through a variety of 
different procedures including: the 'stop clock' procedure, requests for 
en bane, memos circulated to the entire court arguing for and against en 
bane review, and by a vote of all of the active judges on whether to take a 
case en banc."51 
The divisional arrangement abrogates circuit-wide stare decisis and, 
thus, jeopardizes uniformity, coherence and predictability.52 "Each 
regional division would function as a semi-autonomous decisional 
unit."53 This would affect present operations in two important ways. 
46 Letter from Chief judge Ralph K. Winter, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to 
Justice Byron White (Nov. 5, 1998) (last modified Nov. 16, 1998) 
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/Winter.pdf>. 
47 Id. 
48 Hug, supra note 45, at 887. 
49 See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 2; su also Hug, supra note 45, at 909-10. 
50 See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 3. 
51 Hug, supra note 45, at 888. 
52 Su Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 3; s,,e also Hug, supra note 45, at 909-10. 
53 FINAL REPORT, supra note l, at 43. 
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First, the proposal would eliminate the circuit-wide en bane process; en 
bane courts in each division would perform that function. 54 Second, 
panel and en bane decisions of the divisions would have binding effect 
only within each division, essentially creating three separate circuit 
courts.55 
The Commission also suggested a Circuit Division "whose sole 
mission would be to resolve conflicting decisions between the regional 
divisions," that is, those opinions which present "square interdivisional 
conflicts."56 It is important to appreciate that the authority of the 
Circuit Division is sharply circumscribed. First, the notion of square 
conflicts is so narrow that jurisdiction will rarely be invoked. Second, 
only the parties to a case can invoke jurisdiction and "only after the 
panel decision ha[s] been reviewed by the division en bane or a 
divisional en bane ha[s] been sought and denied."57 
The Circuit Division concept would also impose additional 
disadvantages that do not currently exist. One general difficulty is that 
the proposal could foster incessant wrangling and time-consuming 
satellite litigation over what actually constitutes a "square inter-divisional 
conflict" that triggers the jurisdiction of the Circuit Division.58 The 
divisional recommendation would also effectively institute another level 
of appellate review, thus imposing greater cost and delay in resolving 
disputes. 
The divisional concept would also have a particularly detrimental 
impact on litigation in the state of California. The Commission 
proposal places the Eastern and Northern Districts of California in the 
Middle Division and the Central and Southern Districts of California in 
the Southern Division. This means that different interpretations of 
federal law could apply within different parts of California.59 For 
example, if the Middle and Southern Divisions ruled differently on a 
challenge to a statewide initiative in California, the state and those 
individuals and entities subject to state authority might be obligated to 
comply with inconsistent legal decrees. This situation would undermine 
uniformity and respect for the law, would cause confusion for attorneys 
54 See id. at iii. 
55 See id. at 43. 
56 Id. at 45. 
57 Id. 
58 See Hellman Statement, supra note 29, at 3. 
59 See Hug, supra note 45, at 898. 
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and litigants, and would increase forum shopping within California to 
secure favorable rulings. An alternative proposal to place all of 
California in its own division would isolate the development of its law 
from that of its economic partners, and it would not spare the state from 
the stare decisis defects of the divisional proposal. 
In sum, the divisional arrangement will not remedy the problems that 
the Commission stated it would address, and, instead, the approach will 
have numerous deleterious consequences. Even though the 
Commission expressly stated that circuit division was not warranted for 
any circuit, including the Ninth, the divisional proposal effectively 
constitutes a split of the Ninth Circuit. It is also important to appreciate 
that the divisional approach may be irrevocable. Once the divisional 
idea is implemented and circuit-wide stare decisis is abandoned, it may 
be extremely difficult to return to the status quo and, thus, outright 
circuit splitting may be inevitable. Fortunately, there is a readily available 
approach that promises to be more effective and less disruptive than the 
divisional arrangement. That approach is the Evaluation Committee 
and its suggestions for improving Ninth Circuit operations. We explore 
it next. 
IV. THE EVALUATION COMMITTEE APPROACH 
Although there are serious flaws in the divisional restructuring 
proposal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that some observers have 
raised concerns regarding the circuit with the White Commission. Any 
circuit would be remiss if it failed to take such concerns seriously, assess 
their validity, and take appropriate steps to remedy them. That is exactly 
what the Ninth Circuit did in January 1999 when it appointed a 
distinguished ten member Evaluation Committee "to examine the 
existing policies, practices, and administrative structure of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in order to make recommendations to its 
judges to improve the delivery of justice in the region it serves."60 This 
approach, the court believes, is a far more responsible manner of 
addressing and resolving legitimate concerns than the imposition of a 
disruptive and untested restructuring with countless unanticipated and 
potentially counterproductive side effects. 
The Evaluation Committee, chaired by Senior Circuit Judge David R. 
Thompson of San Diego and consisting of circuit judges from all of the 
60 See"Notice and Request for Comment," July 13, 1999 (source available with the authors). 
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administrative units, a representative of the district court bench, a 
prominent scholar of the federal appellate courts, and an experienced 
appellate practitioner,61 has been meeting regularly for the last year to 
investigate and study concerns and issues raised in relation to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. It has focused on consistency of decisions, 
regional sensitivity, productivity and delay, and the en bane process. In 
addition to meeting regularly and reviewing research work from its staff 
attorneys, the Committee has heard from academics and has conducted 
bench-bar focus groups at a variety of locations in the circuit to obtain 
the views and suggestions of the Ninth Circuit bar. It has also widely 
circulated a detailed call for comments from judges, lawyers, and other 
interested parties from across the circuit and across the country. 
The initial results of this initiative have been encouraging. As the 
process is an ongoing one, it should continue to yield positive benefits 
for circuit operations for years to come. In the area of consistency of 
decisions, we have already noted the lack of any objective evidence that 
Ninth Circuit decisions are subject to greater inconsistency than those in 
other circuits. We believe that any conflicts among decisions that have 
occurred have been resolved by the circuit's en bane process. However, 
the perception still remains that such a large circuit cannot avoid 
inconsistencies with so many panels issuing so many opinions. 
The Committee has focused its efforts on increasing the court's 
ability to recognize potential or perceived conflicts early and address 
them directly arid immediately. To obtain assistance, the Committee has 
widely circulated to the bench, bar, and law schools within the circuit, a 
call for help in identifying perceived conflicts among its unpublished 
memorandum dispositions and among published opinions and 
unpublished memorandum dispositions. The court is also considering 
an experiment to relax its citation rules to permit counsel to cite to 
unpublished memorandum dispositions for their persuasive value or to 
highlight conflicts between a published opinion and an unpublished 
disposition. 
61 In addition to the chair, the committee members are Chief District Judge David A. Ezra of 
Honolulu, Ninth Circuit Judge Michael Daly Hawkins of Phoenix, Professor Arthur D. Hellman of 
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Assistant United States Attorney Miriam Krinsky of Los 
Angeles, Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Edward Leavy of Portland, Ninth Circuit judge M. Margaret 
McKeown of Seattle, Ninth Circuit judge Thomas G. Nelson of Boise, Ninth Circuit Judge Mary M. 
Schroeder of Phoenix, and Ninth Circuit Judge Kim M. Wardlaw of Los Angeles. 
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Two other Committee ideas in this area which the court of appeals 
has implemented include establishment of an "electronic mailbox" 
through which judges and lawyers can notify the court of perceived 
conflicts, and the use of staff attorney specialized expertise to spot 
potential conflicts and sensitive decisions and bring them to the court's 
attention for extra scrutiny. 
The Committee is also experimenting with the regional assignment of 
judges in response to various concerns about the need for a regional 
perspective in appellate decision making. The court has already 
adopted and implemented a recommendation that at least one judge 
who resides in the administrative unit (northern, middle, southern) 
where the case originated be assigned to the appellate panel hearing 
that case. The court also is experimenting with holding more panel 
sittings in additional cities across the circuit and combining them with 
bench-bar activities to increase outreach to and communication with all 
parts of the region. 
The court has achieved substantial increases in productivity from the 
use of its innovative motions and screening calendars. Every month a 
screening panel of three judges sits in San Francisco to consider less 
complex cases that can be easily resolved by the application of clearly 
defined circuit precedent. These screening panels will decide an 
average of 340 motions and dispose of an average of 140 appeals on the 
merits. With more judges, the court could increase this output. The 
Committee is also considering other approaches to increase productivity 
that include increased "batching" of cases with common issues before 
the same argument panel for quicker dispositions (something that is 
being done now but would be expanded on a larger scale) and 
designating "lead cases" in which the panel decision would affect a 
whole series of subsequent cases with a common issue. The court is 
expected to experiment with these and other combinations of proposals 
to see if it can continue to make gains in productivity without the benefit 
of additional resources. 
The Ninth Circuit also believes its unique limited en bane process is an 
efficient and effective use of scarce institutional resources which 
operates in a manner that respects the needs and interests of each judge 
to have a role in the process of declaring circuit law. After a threejudge 
panel has rendered its opinion in a case, any judge on the court, 
including a senior judge, may call for a rehearing en bane and write 
memos in support of the call. Within certain time limits, all judges may 
write memos for or against the en bane call. This results in an insightful 
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exchange where every active and senior member of the court is able to 
express a view on the call and on the underlying substantive legal issues 
in the case. After a prescribed period of time for this exchange, all of 
the active judges on the court vote on whether to take the case en bane. 
If a majority is not attained, it represents a decision of the full court that 
the panel opinion should stand. By tradition and understanding in the 
Ninth Circuit, limited en bane decisions are fully accepted by the court as 
being the final decision of the court as a whole. Since 1980, when 
Congress authorized the court to employ the limited en bane process, 
there have been more than 170 limited en bane decisions, one third of 
which were unanimous and three quarters of which were rendered by a 
majority of 8 to 3 or greater. This is a strong indication that a full en 
bane court would have reached the same decision. 
The Evaluation Committee recognizes that some observers perceive 
that the en bane decision may not reflect the views of all of the judges 
because not all of the active judges sit on the en bane court. The 
Committee enlisted the assistance of a distinguished group of academic 
scholars from the economic, political science, and statistics disciplines to 
advise it on the issue of representativeness. They concluded that the 
court could achieve approximately 93 percent representation of the 
views of all of the judges of the court if the limited en bane court 
consisted of seven judges; increasing that number to eleven judges 
achieved a representational percentage of approximately 95 percent 
(and 13 yielded 96 percent). Nonetheless, the court is as concerned 
with perception as it is with reality, and the Committee has since 
recommended an increase in the size of the en bane court. 
Some observers, including the United States Department of Justice 
and the Circuit Justice, have suggested that the court take more cases en 
bane each year. A statute currently requires a majority vote of the active 
judges to take a case en bane.62 In the United States Supreme Court, just 
under a majority vote ( 4 of 9) is sufficient to grant certiorari, and the 
Committee is exploring a similar device to take a case en bane. Both of 
these proposals, relating to the size of the en bane court and the vote 
required to go en bane, along with the requirement of geographical 
representation on all panels mentioned above, are the subject of 
proposed legislation by Senator Dianne Feinstein.63 The court has voted 
62 See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
63 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals En Banc Procedures Act of 1999, S. 1403, 106th Cong. 
(1999). 
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to endorse Senator Feinstein 's bill as a reasoned, responsible alternative 
to the radical resuucturing proposed by The Federal Ninth Circuit 
Reorganization Act of 1999.64 Anticipating that the number of en banes 
will increase in the future, the court has adopted a new procedure, on 
an experimental basis, for the en bane court to sit quarterly throughout 
the year to keep pace with the additional hearings required. 
This is a sampling of the myriad issues explored and acted on by the 
Evaluation Committee as the court seeks to fashion appropriate 
responses to perceived concerns about its operations. The process is an 
ongoing one and reflects the Ninth Circuit's continuing commitment 
and willingness to re-evaluate itself and to further the process of 
experimentation and innovation that will lead to even greater efficiency 
and effectiveness in the years to come. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The White Commission conscientiously discharged its challenging 
responsibilities in the brief time allotted by Congress. However, its 
research has produced no substantial objective or subjective evidence of 
dysfunction in Ninth Circuit administration or court of appeals 
operations that would warrant the Commission's preference for smaller 
decisional units. The Commission's proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals into three autonomous divisions to achieve smaller 
decisional units is a drastic, untested, and flawed approach that will lead 
to less, rather than more, uniformity, consistency, and coherence in the 
development of circuit law. 
The Ninth Circuit itself is seriously considering the concerns raised 
by the Commission. The Ninth Circuit has created an Evaluation 
Committee to reassess thoroughly every aspect of the court's operations. 
The measured approach of the Evaluation Committee, as distinct from 
the disruptive and untested remedy of divisional restructuring, is a much 
more responsible and flexible solution that is grounded in the best 
aspects of what has worked in the past and will succeed in the future. 
We urge Congress to follow carefully the work of the Evaluation 
Committee and to support its approach through legislation that 
authorizes the circuit to continue and expand its experimentation with 
innovative measures to address the large appellate caseload. 
64 S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999). 
